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ABSTRACT 
It is usually accepted that unconditional statements are clearer and less problematic than 
conditional ones. This article goes against this popular belief by advancing the contrarian 
hypothesis that all unconditional statements can be reduced to conditional ones due to the 
way our assumptions support our assertions. In fact, considering the coherentist process by 
which most of our different beliefs mutually support themselves, the only genuine example of 
unconditional statements are cases of self-justified beliefs, but these examples are 
controversial and few and far between. The distinction between unconditional and conditional 
statements is similar to the distinction between assumptions and premises in that is a largely 
conventional idealisation that results from our attempts to limit epistemic complexity. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Some ancient Asian cosmological views are close to the idea of an 
infinite regression of causes, as exemplified in the following 
apocryphal story: A Western traveler encountering an Oriental 
philosopher asks him to describe the nature of the world: “It is a 
great ball resting on the flat back of the world turtle.” “Ah yes, but 
what does the world turtle stand on?” “On the back of a still larger 
turtle.” “Yes, but what does he stand on?” “A very perceptive 
question. But it’s no use, mister; it’s turtles all the way down.” Carl 
Sagan, Gott and the Turtles (1974), in Broca's Brain: Reflections 
on the Romance of Science (1979) 
It is usually accepted that unconditional sentences  are more accessible than conditional ones. 1
Take for instance an unconditional sentence such as ‘John went to the supermarket’. This 
sentence is true if John went to the supermarket, otherwise is false. The fact that John went to 
the supermarket is the truthmaker responsible for the truth of the sentence. There are some 
potential complications here. We can question which worldly entities can be potential 
truthmakers (may we should include state of affairs as well?), ask about the implications of 
truthmaking of tensed sentences (non-presentist theories or the threat of determinism), decide 
whether the primary bearers of truth-value are propositions instead of mere sentences, or even 
doubt whether it is worth positing truthmakers at all (maybe the truthmaking of all sentences 
would require bizarre entities such as negative facts). These are all pertinent questions that we 
will encounter in entries about the subject, but it is fair to say that none of these difficulties 
 Or ‘proposition’. I prefer ‘sentence’, but I will leave this terminological choice to the reader since this will not 1
affect my argumentation. 
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are perceived by most philosophers as unsurmountable. In the worst-case scenario, one can 
make an educated bet on each issue and make peace with it.  
These hurdles pale in comparison with the perplexities presented by conditional 
sentences. For starters, we don’t have any obvious and intuitive way of addressing how 
conditionals represent reality or which worldly entities can make them true. If I say ‘If John 
went to the supermarket, he bought M&Ms’ what would be the actual truthmakers that can 
make this conditional true? It is not obvious there is such a thing as a conditional fact, or even 
a conditional state of affairs. To make matters worse, conditionals seem to have a dual nature. 
On one hand, they are used to represent reality, so they have categorical-like features; but on 
the other hand, they are also inferential in nature, so they can be also interpreted as 
arguments. So are conditionals statements or arguments? Maybe both? We have a tried and 
tested metaphysical vocabulary that allow us to make sense of the truth-value distinctions of 
categorical sentences and their connection to reality. But once we try to extend this 
vocabulary to conditional sentences it falls apart in spectacular fashion. 
One may argue that these hurdles are due to the fact that conditionals are connectives and 
they are more complex by nature. But any rationale in this direction will be a non-starter, 
since, unlike conditionals, connectives such as disjunction and conjunction fit in our basic 
metaphysical toolbox in a seamlessly manner. When I say that ‘John went to the supermarket 
and bought M&Ms’, what I said is true iff it is true that ‘John went to the supermarket’ and it 
is true that ‘John bought M&Ms’. No muss, no fuss. Disjunctions also pass the normalcy test 
with flying colours. The sentence ‘John bought M&Ms or a Hershey’s Bar’ is true iff it is true 
that ‘John bought M&Ms’ or it is true that ‘John bought a Hershey’s Bar’. Notice that I made 
the effort to present the examples solely in natural language so that uninvited intuitions from 
formal practices gets in the mix. A competent language user doesn’t need to be indoctrinated 
in formal logic to accept these truth conditions. If conditionals seem off, it is because they are 
more complicated. We can’t make sense of how conditionals are used to represent how things 
are.  
It gets worse. Our intuitive judgements of probability are also distorted when they are 
applied to conditionals. If I attribute a high probability to a sentence, I believe in it. But what 
would mean to say that a conditional has a high probability? One reasonable guess is that the 
probability of a conditional, say, ‘If John went to the supermarket, he bought M&Ms’, is 
measured by the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. This is the 
thesis known as the Equation . This looks promising for ten minutes, but Lewis would soon 2
show that if ever existed such a conditional, its probability would end up being the same as 
the probability of its mere consequent. This defies belief. The probability that John will buy 
M&Ms given that he went to the supermarket is not intuitively the same as the probability 
that he bought M&Ms . 3
So conditionals don’t get along with unconditional sentences or other connectives, we 
have no idea if they are either arguments or statements, we don’t understand how they can 
represent things in the world and the only tiny intuition that seemed clear is obviously 
incorrect. It would not be a stretch then to suggest that nobody understands conditionals, for 
they bamboozle our intuitions and force our prejudgments into submission. And as if that 
wasn’t enough, it seems that all unconditional sentences are disguised conditionals. 
 See Jeffrey (1964: 702–703).2
 See Lewis (1976: 299–300).3
!2
Conditionals have enormous expressive power, since they can be used to represent anything, 
from metaphysical principles and epistemic relations, to causal chains and empirical 
regularities. But if they can represent anything, everything is reducible to conditionals. This 
becomes acutely clear when we consider the nature of inferential justification and its 
conditional character. The conditionality of our belief systems is presented in section 2. The 
good news is that maybe have a way out of this chaos with a conventional approach. I argue 
that the sheer complexity of our belief systems is overwhelming and that force us to 
distinguish between unconditional and conditional sentences to make the subject more 
tractable. This is an idealised model that involves a deliberate simplification of highly 
complex phenomena. That is the topic of section 3. I conclude in section 4 with one possible 
explanation of the reasons that motivate the view that conditionals have a sui generis 
character.  
2. CONDITIONALS AND REGRESS 
Conditionals have enormous expressive power. They can be used to represent any belief, 
from statements about metaphysical truths and epistemic relations, to assertions on causal 
matters and empirical regularities. The statement ‘This chair is breakable’ can be expressed 
by the conditional ‘If this chair were to drop, it would break’. The true mathematical 
statement that ‘all prime number are only divisible by themselves and by 1’ can be translated 
as ‘If n is not divisible by itself and by 1, it is not prime’. The rules of a football 
championship prevent a match from being called off if it rains, so we can infer that ‘Even if it 
rains, the next match will not be cancelled’. We believe that Oswald is the main suspect for 
Kennedy’s murder, so it is safe to say that ‘If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, someone else 
did’. There are many health risks associated with smoking, so I can say that ‘If you don’t quit 
smoking, you will increase your chances of developing a hearth disease’. It is safe to say that 
every belief can be reduced to a conditional expression. 
It is clear that interrogatives, warnings, requests and other non-assertive speech acts can 
also be reduced to conditionals. I’m expecting Mary to call, I ask ‘What shall I say?’, and this 
is equivalent to the conditional interrogative, ‘If Mary calls, what shall I say?’. John is about 
to embark for his first visit to São Paulo, so I warn him ‘Watch out for the taxi drivers’; 
which amounts to a corresponding conditional warning, ‘If you go to São Paulo, watch out 
for the taxi drivers’. You are going to the supermarket, so I ask ‘Could you please pick up 
some M&M’s?’, which corresponds to the conditional requests, ‘If you’re going to the 
supermarket, could you please pick up some M&M’s?’. The doctor assumes that the patient 
will still be alive in the morning, so she orders the nurse ‘Change the dressing’, and this is 
equivalent to a conditional command, ‘If the patient is still alive in the morning, change the 
dressing’. Without knowing who are going to be the nominees for best picture, but expecting 
Parasite to be one of them, I say ‘I bet you $100 it will win an Oscar’. This corresponds to 
conditional bet, ‘If Parasite is a nominee for best picture, I bet you $100 it will win an Oscar’. 
The list goes on and on. Conditionals are everywhere.  
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This suggests that the way we usually approach argumentative forms is superficial. Let’s 
take for instance a simple argumentative form such as a modus ponens : 4
P → Q 
P _____ 
Q  
But notice how simplistic this picture is. First, there is no acknowledgment of the inferential 
justification character of the second premise. The belief in P is justified by a belief in other 
sentence, let’s say, O. This inferential justification is conditional in nature, for the belief in P 
is only justified if O is justified. This means that the unconditional sentence P is actually a 
disguised conditional O → P. The belief in the conditional presented in the first premise is 
also justified by another sentence, let’s say, N. So the actual sentential form of the first 
sentence should be O → (P → Q). Thus, a more accurate representation of the modus ponens 
argument should be something as follows: 
O → (P → Q) 
O → P ___________ 
Q 
One could reply that this representation is incorrect as follows: the assertion of a conditional 
does not require a commitment to the truth of the consequent, but if P is actually O → P in 
disguise, then the conditional would uniquely require a commitment to the truth value of the 
consequent. Indeed, with the exception of combination of truth values in which the 
antecedent is true and the consequent is false, the assertion of conditionals in general do not 
require any particular commitment to the truth values of its components. But this is still 
consistent with some conditionals requiring particular commitments to truth values. The most 
obvious example in this case is an even-if such as ‘Even if it rains, the match will not be 
cancelled’, which is asserted under the assumption that the consequent is true. If it turns out 
that the consequent is false, the speaker will not infer the falsity of the antecedent by modus 
tollens, but abandon the conditional altogether. Another example is when I assert ‘If John’s 
speaking the truth, I'm a Dutchman’. I am not willing to infer that I am a Dutchman if it turns 
out that John was telling the truth because the conditional was asserted under the assumption 
that both the antecedent and the consequent are false. In this case, I assert the conditional 
precisely because I’m inviting my hearer to conclude that the antecedent is false by a modus 
tollens inference. 
But this representation can still be considered inaccurate for different reasons. For 
starters, it ignores that the justification of a belief usually involves multiple sentences. The 
other defective bit is that that both premises share the sentence Q, so they should share at 
least one antecedent. Let’s say then that the first premise is justified by sentences L, M, N and 
O; and that the second premise is justified by N and O. Thus we have the following 
argumentative form: 
(L&M&N&O) → (P → Q) 
(N&O) → P _____________________ 
 I will use ‘→’ for natural language conditionals and capital letters such as P and Q for sentential variables. I 4
will not use quotes to highlight the use-mention distinction when there is no risk of confusion.
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Q 
We are not done. The conclusion is justified by the premises, so it should carry their load. The 
result of this modification is: 
(L&M&N&O) → (P → Q) 
(N&O) → P ___________________________________________ 
(((L&M&N&O) → (P → Q))&((N&O) → P)) →  Q 
It is obvious that each sentence that was brought to the propositional form of the premises is 
also justified by additional sentences. Let’s say that L was justified by K, M by J, and N by I. 
Then we will have the following improvement of the argumentative form: 
((I&J&K) → (L&M&N&O)) → (P → Q) 
((J&K) → (N&O)) → P _____________________________________________________________ 
((I&J&K) → (L&M&N&O)) → (P → Q))&((J&K) → (N&O)) → P) →  Q 
Since even the inferential rules based on what we deem valid argumentative forms are also 
conditional in nature, in order to accept the validity of a modus ponens argument you need to 
accept the corresponding conditional containing the premises and the conclusion . So the 5
argumentative form can be reconstructed as the following conditional: 
(((I&J&K) → (L&M&N&O)) → (P → Q))&(((J&K) → (N&O)) → P) → (((I&J&K) → 
(L&M&N&O)) → (P → Q))&((J&K) → (N&O)) → P) →  Q) 
This is too cumbersome, so let’s simplify this structure a little bit by applying importation to 
each premise. Thus we will have:  
( ( ( I & J & K & L & M & N & O ) ) → ( P → Q ) ) & ( ( ( J & K & N & O ) ) → P ) → 
(((I&J&K&L&M&N&O)) → (P → Q))&((J&K&N&O)) → P) →  Q) 
If we remove the repeated assumptions, we will have: 
(((I&J&K&L&M&N&O)) → (P → Q))&P) →  Q 
If we use importation one more time, we get: 
((I&J&K&L&M&N&O&P) → Q)&P) →  Q 
It is not a consolation that the resulting conditional is leaner than the previous two because in 
order to make sense of inferential justification we will have to go on adding more and more 
sentences which would result in an increasingly larger conditional. The deeper we go in the 
 See Carroll (1895). 5
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justification process, the higher the level of complexity will be . In this revised picture, all 6
our unconditional sentences containing our beliefs will be packed in an unimaginably long 
conjunction in the antecedent of conditional—you can simply reapply importation when a 
new inferential dependence is added and a new conjunct will be added to the antecedent. If 
they happen to be asserted, other complex sentences such as conjunctions and disjunctions 
will be under the scope of this conditional as well. There are no argumentative forms 
anymore since they will be all reduced to a single conditional . Now, suppose we pressed the 7
proponent of this belief system with questions about the justification for this conditional. She 
would feel compelled to provide additional justification that would represent a fresh new 
antecedent of another conditional. As a matter of fact, since we update and review our belief 
systems on a daily basis with the introduction or removal of beliefs, this conditional would 
change and grow constantly and reveal the systemic character of a belief system. It’s 
conditionals all the way down.  
This radical reconstruction can be supported by an independent argument that relies on 
the nature of argumentation. When an argument is made, an arguer claims that the truth of the 
premises necessitates or makes it probable the truth of the conclusion. So it is obvious that 
her reasons to accept the premises and the conclusion should be involved in the evaluation of 
the argument. Thus, the question of whether a given argument is valid or strong will also 
depend on whether the reasons that support the premises in conjunction with the premises 
necessitate or make the conclusion probable. Consequently, a more accurate representation of 
argumentative forms will be more complex and require considerably more analysis of the 
arguers’ reasons. Now, the arguer’s reasons to accept the premises will involve some sort of 
inferential justification, so unconditional sentences will turn out to be conditionals and 
conditionals will be under the scope of other conditionals, and so on and so forth.   
It is important to observe that some simplifications were adopted in the description above 
to make things more intuitive even though they are not entirely accurate. One obvious 
idealisation is that we took for granted that the assumptions that lead to the acceptance of the 
first conditional premise are the same that support the second premise. It is expected that 
some of them will be common since the first premise would require some understanding of 
what made P true in the first place, but that is not a given. If it were a given, we would have 
to say that the second premise is already contained in the first one. That this is not a given 
becomes clear when we consider that the arguer could defend the falsity of the consequent if 
she believed in the falsity of the antecedent. This means that the conditionals that correspond 
to our inferential justification can also assume the character of a modus tollens if they involve 
the refusal of certain assumptions, especially in reductios. The descriptions connecting the 
web of inferential justification associated with other argumentative forms such as 
hypothetical syllogism and disjunctive syllogism would be entirely different. Never mind the 
fact that some of the conditionals in the justification chain would involve a commitment to a 
stronger strict implication. What is undeniable is that whatever is the inferential process they 
will ultimately be reducible to a single conditional, notwithstanding its enormous complexity.  
 It could be argued that the use of variable formulas could diminish the complexity a bit. The reason why this is 6
not good enough is that it would defeat the purpose of the whole enterprise since it would hide the logical form 
of individual sentences. The idea is that we need to represent arguments more accurately, not less. 
 One alternative way to maintain the distinction is to include the separate assertion of the extra antecedent. 7
Thus, instead of N → (P → Q) we would have N & (N → (P → Q)). This would turn the main conditionals in 
conjunctions, but this would imply that argumentative forms such as modus tollens and contraposition will have 
inconsistent sentences.
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The impact of this revision on conditional theory is devastating. For starters, the vast 
amounts of information that would be necessary to evaluate a single conditional would turn it 
into a computational challenge. The fact alone that some of our beliefs mutually support 
themselves would mean that many conditionals would need to be reinterpreted as 
biconditionals. The resulting argumentative form would become so cumbersome using our 
current logical notation that different conventions would be required. For example, it would 
be necessary to use a detailed network graph to represent a simple argument. The way we 
would draw such graph will also reflect our beliefs about epistemic justification. For instance, 
coherentists, foundationalists and infinitists will present completely different representations 
of the same ‘modus ponens argument’ and their graphs will be different for each arguer—see 
figure 1.  
But let’s ignore these multiple difficulties for the sake of argumentation and consider some 
hypotheses in conditional theory. Let’s also assume that we would have enough patience and 
sufficient information to test how the different conditional theories would fare when they are 
applied to such a monstrous conditional from an external perspective. Take for instance the 
notion that the acceptance of a conditional is measured by the conditional probability of its 
consequent given its antecedent. The current probability formalism is inadequate to fit in the 
revised picture we offer. For can we explain the conditional acceptance of a conditional given 
another conditional given the previous acceptance of multiple conditionals? You cannot 
measure the probability of an event given the occurrence of another event in chain of 
conditional assumptions. This would require a serious revision in probability calculus if the 
nature of conditionals were to be taken seriously. How about according to conditional-
assertion theories? They claim that conditional is an assertion of the consequent given the 
antecedent. These theories will probably fail because they refuse conditional embedding and 
it is not obvious that we can reduce all conditionals by importation. Possible world theories 
would also drown in the complexity of the phenomena because it is not obvious which world 
is the closest one where the antecedent is true. The fact that the conditional also contains 
another conditional in the antecedent would make the task of world selection even more 
demanding. Possible world theories seem accessible when they are applied to banal 
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Fig. 1.  The use of a Gephi graph for illustrative purposes. There is an expansion of 
complexity when we abandon our philosophical toys. 
conditionals, but are very obscure with more problematic conditionals. The material account 
will maintain that the conditional is true when it is not the case that the antecedent is true and 
the consequent is false. One obvious problem is that one sentence in the antecedent will 
probably be false, thus making the whole conditional vacuously true. There are also some 
considerations about possible transformations of the conditional into different expressions, 
e.g., if the belief system conditional is material we can say that it is equivalent to a 
disjunction ¬((I&J&K&L&M&N&O&P) → Q)&P) ∨  Q or the negation of a conjunction 
¬((I&J&K&L&M&N&O&P) → Q)&P)&¬Q. But that’s all assuming that the simplifications 
we made in the conditional above faithfully represent a belief system in its entirety. The fact 
alone that I relied on importation to achieve that result can be criticised, since it is a 
controversial inferential rule. As I mentioned before, the whole picture would be something 
far more complicated, so the jury is still out on conditional theory.  
One could object that the only thing my argumentation shows is that there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between each conditional and unconditional sentence. So there is no real 
reduction going on, for conditional sentences can be ‘reduced’ to unconditional ones just as 
well. But this criticism misses the target because once we understand the nature of 
unconditional sentences properly, the only distinction is between bigger and smaller 
conditionals. Somewhere along the inferential line we call it quits and cut the ties with the 
background assumptions, but this happens with both premises of a typical modus ponens. The 
only difference is that with the constructions that are traditionally certified as conditionals the 
cut is made only after one assumption was introduced in the assertion content, whereas with 
unconditional premises all background assumptions are left out. The fact still remains that 
both statements are made conditionally on some background assumptions that were ruled out 
of the picture. The content that is explicitly expressed is only the tip of a vast iceberg of 
assumptions that are tied together and embody our belief systems—see figure 2.    
 
 
The reason why simple facts such as these are ignored is that we were indoctrinated by logic 
textbooks and other unwritten conventions about logic. We are oblivious to the most obvious 
things due to thoughtless repetition and prevalent practices. When such facts are mentioned at 
all in the literature, they are overlooked as ‘unstated premises’, ‘background assumptions’ 
and ‘ceteris paribus conditions’. Consequently, these subjects are either viewed as mere 
curiosities or thrown in ‘the garbage can’ of pragmatics. But while this dogmatic approach 
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Fig. 2. The white nodes represent the 
conditionality that is beneath the assertion 
surface, and the black ones the conditionality 
on the assertion surface.
has no epistemic merits, it surely has pragmatic ones. We should avoid, and not embrace, a 
more accurate representation of argumentation, since it would require such a relentless level 
of complexity that would cripple our understanding of the world. As I argued above, not only 
the evaluation of a simple argument would amount to a detailed analysis of a belief system 
and the division between logic and epistemology would blur. Worse, considering the 
coherentist process by which most of our different beliefs mutually support themselves, the 
only genuine example of unconditional statements would be cases of self-justified beliefs, but 
these examples are controversial and few and far between to make the distinction meaningful.  
The impeding doom could be detailed in alternative ways. The first immediate unwanted 
consequence is that all conditionals would become useless without unconditional sentences. 
Conditionals are only inferential tickets that allow us to extract one unconditional sentence 
from another, but without unconditional sentences in the first place, there is no content to 
extract in the first place. Instead, we would have endless chains of conditional sentences 
floating in belief systems and bound to each other. If there were an omniscient being in 
possession of a complete description of each arguer’s belief system, she would see each and 
every argument of an individual as connected, but would not be able to make any inference 
about any subject whatsoever. To use quantum mechanics talk, it is as if all our assertions and 
theoretical commitments were entangled conditionals. Worse, we would have no reasons 
whatsoever to accept one premise over another. The reason is simple: when an arguer accepts 
a premise she proposes, she does so because there are reasons to think the premise is true. But 
if the reasons to accept the premise will now become part of the content of premise, and the 
reasons that motivated these reasons will also be represented in the premise, there will be no 
reasons left to support the premise in the first place. Thus, even if we managed the impossible 
task of representing in a faithful manner all the background beliefs in the premises, this 
would mean that every premise would be arbitrary, which would mean that every argument 
would be arbitrary. But the more serious looming threat is that conditionals themselves would 
become meaningless, since they only make sense with unconditional sentences. To add insult 
to injury, since both unconditional statements and arguments are disguised conditionals, they 
would also become meaningless as a consequence. The last nail on the coffin is that our belief 
systems would be compromised and become meaningless as a result.  
To sum up, acknowledging the real extension of the conditionality phenomenon would 
imply that (1) logic should become a sub-discipline of epistemology; (2) the current logic 
notation must be abandoned, and the evaluation of each argumentative form should require 
years of study and individual analysis of the arguer’s assumptions; (3) our belief systems 
would be circular and every argument would be arbitrary; (4) conditionals themselves would 
be meaningless, which imply that categorical statements, arguments and even belief systems 
would become meaningless as a result. It would be a catastrophe.  
2. THE WISDOM OF CONVENTIONALISM 
So perhaps sticking to our baby logic notions wouldn’t be such a bad idea, after all. One way 
to justify the status quo on the subject is argue that the distinction between unconditional and 
conditional sentences is a conventional matter that arises out of our necessity to control chaos 
and divide belief systems in manageable chunks. The distinction will vary from person to 
person according to the circumstances and interests. I can legislate by convention that a given 
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premise is P because I’m not interested in a more complete logical form, whereas another 
person might be interested in one its assumptions in a different context, and thus will fixate 
by convention that it is a disguised conditional such as O → P. Both options are equally 
correct and the choice between them will depend on what we find more convenient to use in 
the context.  
So the abrupt cut of our belief systems into ‘unconditional sentences’ and ‘conditional 
sentences’ is an epistemic fiction we create for our purposes, not a factual question. This 
distinction has a naturalness that reflects our inferential customs. We conform, and should 
conform, to such a convention because it makes our lives easier by allowing us to exchange 
information, share beliefs and dispute ideas. Like all conventions, it is a natural and collective 
reaction to a demand and it is guided by pragmatic reasons. Our cognitive resources are 
limited, so demarcations are needed. In a sense, not only modus ponens arguments, but other 
valid argumentative forms are conventional to the degree they are cut-outs of larger 
structures. Whether the truth of the premises is preserved in a given argumentative form is 
not a conventional matter, but the fact that those premises are presented in that manner is a 
matter of free choice. This is more evident in logic since it involves a technical formal 
language openly customised to analyse natural language. The conventions are acquired either 
in an explicit manner in the form of books, as in a tacit fashion by imitation of the peers.  
It is a framework we choose for philosophical practice. That we decide to rely on 
simplified fictions in logic textbooks and articles is a conventional stipulation that is 
motivated by pragmatic considerations such as simplicity. This is in agreement with known 
conventional habits in our understanding of logic. There is something to be said about the 
different communities and their related practices. There are different schools in they may vary 
in the importance they attribute to formalism in the evaluation of arguments, which variable 
letters are used or even the role of natural language. To take one of many examples, 
conditional logics are approached in completely different ways by linguists, philosophers of 
language, cognitive psychologists and logicians (which may also adhere to their importance 
they give to formalism). The disagreements about these practices may lead to unfair criticism, 
group thinking, bibliographical seclusion and misuse of theoretical resources. This is 
expected. The violation of conventions and unwritten rules is commonly received with 
sanctions or negative reactions that are intended to work as mechanisms of conformity. But 
even such vastly different communities will still adhere to some basic concepts, including the 
aforementioned distinction between unconditional and conditional sentences. 
Of course, that does not mean that every pragmatic decision is worth it. There is an 
infinite number of valid argumentative forms in any given logic systems, but we focus all our 
attentions in a handful of them such as modus ponens, hypothetical syllogism, etc. Some 
systems that are proposed as alternatives to classical logic are attempts to fix just one or two 
argumentative forms, such as the paradoxes of material implication. This beam counter 
thinking is superficial because argumentative forms are intertwined by an immense logical 
web. So removing the validity of one argumentative form in a system leads to unintended 
revisions in other parts of the system. There are infinitely many valid argumentative forms, 
but we can count on our fingers the number of argumentative forms that attracts all our 
attention and supports our main intuitions. The immense complexity and systemic nature of 
the subject is in sharp contrast with our provincial thinking and piecemeal analysis. The 
cognitive limitations of human beings are exacerbated by the realities of theoretical practice. 
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We need to restrict our focus, so there is a tendency to think in over-restricted manner that 
may be detrimental to our understanding of the subject. The unwritten rules might help, but 
they can also create prejudices and keep us in little bubbles that can’t scratch the surface of 
the subject. If we coordinate our efforts in superficial thinking, the result is merely fictional. 
A similar example of inadequate convention is the arbitrary distinction between arguer’s 
assumptions and premises. Undergrads will meet this distinction in logic textbooks and 
wonder how the arguer’s assumptions can be left out. If they ever express this worry, they 
will be informed that this is a simple mistake, since assumptions are not premises. This 
dogmatic reaction is understandable since there are no good answers on the subject, to be 
honest. So the ‘everybody does like this, so it is right way’ instinctive remark end up having 
the last word because it is our interests that decide what is a premise and what is an 
assumption, just as pragmatic conventions decide what is a conditional or not. But while is 
understandable that we have to stop our analysis somewhere, since the arguer’s assumptions 
are simply too many and intertwined to be analysed in a more precise manner, something is 
still amiss here. For a deductive argument is nothing more than an arguer’s claim to validity. 
So it is obvious that her reasons to accept both the premises and the conclusion should be 
involved in the evaluation. Then the question of whether the premises of a given argument 
necessitate the conclusion or not will also depend on whether the reasons that support the 
premises together with the premises necessitate the conclusion or not. Consequently, a more 
accurate representation of argumentative forms will be needed, even if some arbitrary 
epistemic cut-out is made somewhere after the first layer of assumptions. The assumption/
assertion and unconditional/conditional distinctions are correlated since the evidential 
relation between assumptions and assertions takes a conditional form—see figure 3. 
If some conventions are inadequate , it is because the arbitrariness of a convention is 8
restricted by non-social facts. The distinction between unconditional and conditional 
sentences, and the reliance on textbook cases as paradigmatic examples of argumentative 
forms is good because it provides a clear and simpler way to understand basic inferences and 
validity. But there is some reason to this choice too. So it is not as if we could just invent new 
systems and create adherence to it by imposition and some followers. One can design a car 
with a steering wheel that is controlled by foot, but nobody will want this car. The convention 
needs to provide a meaningful advantage over current practices or it will never get any 
 It is important to observe that my argumentation is solely focused on theoretical conventions designed to solve 8
problems. Conventions such as games and other non-cognitive problems are not the focus of this article.
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Fig. 3. The assumptions are left out of the logical 
analysis. This is a common practice. 
traction. Conventions are designed to satisfy practical human needs and solve coordination 
problems. So deviant conventions need to satisfy them too and represent an improvement 
over the accepted practices. 
The conventional character of the distinction between unconditional and conditional 
sentences is also reminiscent of the causes/conditions distinction. The cause of a phenomenon 
is usually associated with a change in the background facts that was sufficient for something 
to occur, whereas a condition is perceived as the elements that are present in the background 
facts that are necessary for something to occur . Suppose that there is a wildfire in the woods 9
that is reported as being caused by the fall of a lighted cigarette. But the cigarette was just as 
necessary for the occurrence of the fire as the presence of oxygen, which we arbitrarily 
decide to ignore as condition. This is motivated by a multitude of reasons, including the 
moral accountability of the person who dropped the cigarette. Another way in each the cause/
effect and unconditional/conditional distinctions are similar involves what causality experts 
usually refer as causal fields. The look for a specific cause is a causal question that is posed 
about a particular causal field . This field might be about a wildfire, a traffic accident or a 10
homicide. Causal considerations that are not relevant for our concerns are promptly 
disregarded. Now making a choice to consider only certain aspects of the situation as causally 
significant is no different from making surgical cuttings in belief systems for conceptual 
analysis. In both cases we are knowingly making distinctions that are arbitrary from a general 
point of view that takes in consideration all the facts, but that are perfectly acceptable in that 
situation due to our human limitations and concerns—see figure 4.    
 
Particular convention practices are almost always part of larger conventional institutions. 
Theoretical conventions and behaviour standards are cogs in the academic machine, which  as 
a cognitive oriented activity is a collective endeavour by default. Idealisations that are 
ingeniously designed to exclude extensive segments of reality in order to increase precision 
and focus is in its DNA. The convention is arbitrary within reason, for it is supposed to be 
beneficial for the collective goal. So conformity ensues and any rare occasion of deviation is 
punished. There is an obvious tension in resting a convention on a practical reason, when the 
activity the convention serves is cognitive-oriented. The expectation is that the justification 
 See Ducasse (1969: 19).9
 See Mackie (1974: 35).10
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Fig. 4. Conventions at work. C1 is taken as the only cause of 
the phenomenon. C2-C7 are ruled out as conditions.
for a cognitive endeavour should be solely epistemic and not pragmatic. But knowledge is 
only a realistic pursuit when it recognises and operates within the intrinsic limitations of the 
epistemic agent. It would be nonsensical to impose epistemic demands that only omniscient 
gods can satisfy if we have in mind a human practice. It is not about being complacent about 
ignorance.   
There are no independent and pre-existing divisions between conditional and 
unconditional sentences. This division is a convenience, and it helps us sharing ideas and 
exchanging information. The typical structure of argumentative forms presented in logic 
textbooks are just as convention as the choice of logical symbols. The convention between 
conditionals and unconditionals is implicit and spontaneous. It is not implemented by a 
particular decision in any given moment in time. It needs to be this way under the penalty of 
circularity, for in order to apply the distinction between conditionals and unconditionals we 
already have to make a distinction between them. The rules and examples we see in textbook 
are codifications of practices that always occurred in natural language. They result of an 
epistemological need to make sense of arguments when the real structure of argumentation is 
too complex for a compelling analysis.  
The description of the conventional and social aspect of our baby logic conventions 
assumes the importance of idealised models. These models occur when there is an intentional 
attempt to simplify or distort highly complex phenomena in order to make them more 
accessible and easier to grasp . The distinction between conditional and unconditional 11
sentences is a deliberate simplification or distortion of belief systems in order to cope with 
their immense complexity. The already mentioned distinction between background conditions 
and causes are also idealised models. We can also add to the list physics models involving 
frictionless planes, economy models that work under assumptions that agents are omniscient 
and fully rational and biology models that study isolated populations.  
It is possible that the conditionals/unconditionals distinction can be even described as a 
toy model. A toy model represents an extreme simplification and distortion of the research 
subject by focusing on a very restrict number of explanatory factors . There are some 12
examples of toy models that can also be described as caricatures, since they focus on a few 
salient properties of a system and distort them into extreme cases . This description fits our 13
explanation like a glove. The distinction between conditionals and unconditionals is 
caricature that focus on epistemic cuts, thereby disregarding all other factors that could 
negatively impact on our understanding of logical consequence including the background 
assumptions of the speaker and the inferential nature of belief justification. This will allow us 
to ‘get a feeling’ of what a valid argumentative form looks like, get used to logic conventions, 
etc.  
There is a non-negligible risk though that due to conceptual habits we might end up 
taking up the model for the reality. It is one thing to use an extreme simplification to get used 
to logical notions and possibly develop a theory of logical consequence. It is entirely another 
to take for granted that this extreme simplification will fit in real-life argumentation. This 
becomes clear with other toys, such as the basic argumentative forms that students learn in 
 See Potochnik (2017).11
 See Hartmann (1995).12
 See Gibbard and Varian (1978). 13
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logic courses. Argumentative forms such as modus ponens and hypothetical syllogism are 
nowhere to be seen in real-life sophisticated deductive practices. The notion that our 
simplifications accurately match reality because they work in idealised conditions should be 
taken with a grain of salt.  
4. CONDITIONAL SENTENCES SHOULDN’T BE WEIRD 
We tend to view conditionals as fundamentally weirder and more inaccessible than 
unconditional ones, but given that conditional and unconditional sentences are ultimately 
equivalent, our main intuitions on the subject are fundamentally wrong. This demands some 
explanation. One educated guess is that the blame lies on the prevalent view that conditionals 
can be interpreted as functions. This is bound to cloud our views on the subject, since we are 
moved away from the use of conditional sentences in natural language, which will only 
reinforce their artificial character. Conditionals are intuitive and natural when they are 
interpreted alongside unconditional sentences and their inferential justification, but they look 
strange and inaccessible when they are interpreted as artificial functions. This doesn’t imply 
that conditional logics that rely on such functions are incorrect, but it might shed some light 
on why there are some uneasiness associated with the distinct hypothesis about the nature 
conditionals. Whether there is some important piece of the puzzle hidden underneath this 
aspect of conditional theories remains to be seen. 
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